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Abstract: An ongoing debate in the philosophy of action concerns the prevalence of 
moral luck: instances in which an agent’s moral responsibility is due, at least in part, to 
factors beyond his control. I point to a unique problem of moral luck for agents who 
depend upon Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) for bodily movement. BCIs may 
misrecognize a voluntarily formed distal intention (e.g., a plan to commit some illicit act 
in the future) as a control command to perform some overt behavior now. If so, then 
BCI-agents may be deserving of punishment for the unlucky but foreseeable outcomes 
of their voluntarily formed plans, whereas standard counterparts who abandon their 
plans are not. However, it seems that the only relevant difference between BCI-agents 
and their standard counterparts is just a matter of luck. I briefly sketch different 
solutions that attempt to avoid this type of moral luck, while remaining agnostic on 
whether any succeeds. If none of these solutions succeeds, then there may be a unique 
type of moral luck that is unavoidable with respect to deserving punishment for certain 
BCI-mediated behaviors. 
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An ongoing debate in the philosophy of action concerns the prevalence of moral 
luck: instances in which an agent’s moral responsibility is due, at least in part, to factors 
beyond his control. Consider a purported example of outcome luck: one assassin succeeds 
in shooting and killing his target, but a qualitatively identical assassin misses simply 
because a bird flies in the path of his bullet (Nagel 1979). The only relevant difference 
between the two lies in factors beyond their control. Though some have the intuition that 
the successful assassin is more blameworthy than the unsuccessful assassin (since he 
killed someone), it strikes others as unfair to judge him as more blameworthy for a 
difference in outcomes that is completely due to luck.  
Rainey, Maslen, and Savulescu seem intent on avoiding a kind of outcome luck 
for agents who depend upon Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) for bodily movement. One 
concern raised is that BCI devices may misrecognize certain involuntary mental events 
(e.g., involuntarily imagining performing some action) as control commands to perform 
overt behaviors. It seems unfair to judge that BCI-agents are blameworthy for outcomes 
of involuntary mental events.  
Yet, the concerns with moral luck raised by BCI-mediated behavior extend 
beyond the authors’ observation that involuntary mental events might result in overt 
behavior. A distinct problem of moral luck arises from the possibility that BCIs may 
misrecognize a voluntarily formed distal intention (e.g., a plan to commit some illicit act 
in the future) as a control command to perform some overt behavior now. Consider:  
 
ABANDONED PLAN: Typical Terry stands with his business rival, Gary, on top of a skyscraper 
(their usual meeting place for arranging high-stakes business deals). Terry judges that it 
would be advantageous to get rid of Gary. Inspired by the view, Terry voluntarily forms a 
plan to shove Gary off of the skyscraper on some future occasion (when fewer people are 
around). Moments later, however, Terry has a crisis of conscience and consequently abandons 
his plan. 
 
PREMATURE EXECUTION: BCI-Barry is just like Typical Terry except that he depends upon 
a BCI to control his prosthetic arms. Through training, Barry has become aware that BCIs 
can misrecognize distal intentions to Φ later as control commands to Φ now. When Barry 
voluntarily forms a plan to shove Gary off of the skyscraper on some future occasion, his BCI 
misrecognizes this as a control command, resulting in Barry’s prosthetic arms shoving Gary 
off of the skyscraper to his death. 
 
Although Barry did not intend to kill Gary then, Gary’s subsequent death was 
nevertheless a foreseeable result of voluntarily forming his plan. Consequently, Barry is 
plausibly blameworthy for Gary’s death.1 So, although both agents are (we can assume) 
blameworthy for their voluntarily formed plans to kill Gary, Barry seems more 
blameworthy than Terry. But suppose that the following counterfactual is true: were it 
not for the BCI’s misrecognition, Barry also would have had a crisis of conscience 
moments later and consequently abandoned his plan. If so, then it seems the only 
difference between Barry’s plan and Terry’s plan (such that the former resulted in Gary’s 
death and the latter did not) is a matter of luck. Given this, the intuition that Barry is more 
blameworthy than Terry seems unjustifiable.  
In response, one might suggest the following solution: While Barry is 
blameworthy for more items than Terry (i.e., the voluntarily formed plan and Gary’s 
death), this does not entail that Barry is any more blameworthy than Terry: we can 
distinguish between the scope of an agent’s blameworthiness and the degree to which the 
agent is blameworthy (Zimmerman 2002, 560). 
While this solution may successfully avoid outcome luck concerning 
blameworthiness, the scope-degree distinction does not apply as neatly to concerns about 
how (in such cases) the law should punish criminal behavior mistakenly mediated by 
BCIs. While the movement of Barry’s prosthetic arms mistakenly mediated by the BCI 
 
1 This is consistent with the claim that Barry is not as responsible for Gary’s death as he would 
be if the movement of his arms were the result of an intention to do so then, or if Barry actually 
foresaw at the time that forming his distal intention might have the specific result that it did (Miller 
2019). 
does not constitute an action (since it’s not appropriately causally related to his distal 
intention), it is comparable to the operation of a machine that is known to occasionally 
malfunction. The case in question is therefore analogous to involuntary manslaughter, 
where someone’s death is an unintended result of an intentional action (in Barry’s case, 
the mental action of voluntarily forming his plan). Given these considerations, BCI-
agents like Barry seem deserving of punishment for the unlucky but foreseeable outcomes 
of their voluntarily formed plans, whereas standard counterparts (like Terry) who 
abandon their plans clearly cannot be deserving of punishment for outcomes that never 
come about.  
But again, the difference between such agents seems just a matter of luck. If Terry 
is not deserving of punishment, how is it fair to judge that Barry is? Here I sketch some 
different solutions that attempt to avoid this type of moral luck, while remaining agnostic 
on whether any succeeds.2 
 
Solution 1: One might deny that the only difference between Barry and Terry is just a 
matter of luck. Since Barry depends upon a BCI for bodily movement, he has a special 
obligation to be careful in forming any intentions (even intentions to perform actions at 
later times), since he knows that his BCI device might misrecognize such intentions as 
control commands to perform overt behaviors then and there. Because of this, Gary’s 
being shoved then was a foreseeable (and thus avoidable) outcome of Barry’s plan, 
whereas this was not so for Terry’s plan.  
One may object that Solution 1 avoids outcome luck only at the cost of embracing 
a different kind of moral luck: constitutive luck (i.e., luck in how an agent is constituted). 
 
2 Whether outcome luck is acceptable concerning punishment more generally is contested (Hart 
1968, Lewis 1989). I take my focus here to be a unique problem of outcome luck for BCI-agents. 
We may presume that it is just a matter of bad luck that Barry requires a BCI and 
consequently has special obligations to be cautious that standard agents do not have. In 
response, the proponent of Solution 1 may point out that this sort of luck is ubiquitous: 
even standard agents commonly have special obligations due to constitutive luck (e.g., I 
may have an obligation to take extra precautions around fragile items because I happen 
to be particularly clumsy). Even so, there may be something relevantly different about 
placing special expectations on agents who depend upon BCIs for bodily movement: it 
seems unreasonable to expect BCI-agents to be as careful as they would need to be in 
order to avoid the sort of outcomes in question. Indeed, it would require an enormous 
shift in the control we normally exercise over our mental lives to monitor each plan we 
form as though it might be translated into overt behavior then and there. 
 
Solution 2: One might agree that that the only difference between Barry and Terry is just 
a matter of luck, and maintain that BCI-agents are no more deserving of punishment than 
their standard counterparts. This leaves it open whether the two agents deserve any 
punishment.  
 
Solution 2a: One might maintain that both agents deserve punishment. If so, however, 
we would want to know in virtue of what Terry deserves punishment. Terry might be 
blameworthy for his voluntarily formed plan, but it is implausible that he deserves 
punishment for a purely mental action. Nor does it seem reasonable for the law to 
treat such fleeting intentions (supposing they were discovered) as attempts to commit 
crimes, especially since agents like Terry never take any steps to actualize their plans.3 
 
Solution 2b: One might maintain that neither agent deserves punishment. This entails 
that Barry does not deserve punishment for Gary’s death. Someone who opts for 
Solution 2b could support this contention either by maintaining that (i) Barry is not 
even blameworthy for Gary’s death (something plausibly required for deserving 
punishment), or that (ii) Barry is blameworthy for Gary’s death, but this fact is 
insufficient to make him deserving of punishment for it. (i) is controversial, since it 
is widely held that agents are blameworthy for foreseeable outcomes of earlier items 
for which they are blameworthy (Rosen 2008, 604; Fischer and Tognazzini 2009, 
537-538).4 And a defense of (ii) would require an explanation of why being 
blameworthy for someone’s death is insufficient for deserving punishment. 
 
If none of these solutions succeeds, then there may be a unique type of moral 
luck that is unavoidable with respect to deserving punishment for certain BCI-mediated 
behaviors.  
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